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IV

Statement of Issues and Standards of Review
This case involves Susan Olsen's efforts to avoid paying a $678 debt to the
University of Phoenix for (i) unpaid course tuition, (ii) the costs of course materials, and
(iii) a late fee. In Ms. Olsen's deposition, she admitted to having taken classes for which
she did not pay. In addition, the University provided undisputed evidence that Ms. Olsen
accessed course materials for which she admits she did not pay. Nonetheless, in
opposing the University's motion for summary judgment, Ms. Olsen asserted that she
should not be required to pay the debt and that the University should not have attempted
to collect the debt or ultimately have reported her delinquent account to the credit
bureaus. The district court rejected her assertions as lacking any evidentiary support and
entered summary judgment in favor of the University.
Issue: Whether the district court correctly concluded that (i) Ms. Olsen failed to
pay for all of her classes and electronic reading materials she accessed and used and
(ii) the University properly attempted to collect the monies Ms. Olsen admits she owes.
Standard of Review: The district court's decision to grant summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness. Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, f 10, 127 P.3d 256.

Determinative Provisions
Determinative provisions are attached at Addendum B.

i

Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
In January of 2004, Ms. Olsen enrolled as an online student at the University of

Phoenix, taking various graduate level courses online to satisfy the requirements for a
Utah elementary teaching certificate. Ms. Olsen later transferred from the "online"
campus to the Utah ground campus ("Utah Campus") to take a graduate level directed
study course. At the time of her transfer, Ms. Olsen had not paid for two of her online
courses. In the subsequent months, the University attempted to collect both unpaid
tuition and a fee for electronic reading materials that Ms. Olsen used, which totaled $678,
including a late fee. Eventually, the University sent the account to collections.
On May 31, 2006, Ms. Olsen brought this lawsuit, asserting claims for breach of
contract, violation of the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, violation of the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act, and for misrepresentation and infliction of emotional
distress. (R. 1-16.) On April 30, 2008, the University moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that (i) Ms. Olsen admitted she had not paid the for all of her courses, (ii) the
University properly charged Olsen for online reading materials she accessed and used,
and (iii) the University thus had done nothing wrong in its collection efforts. (R. 62-179.)
On May 12, 2009, the district court granted the motion, ruling that Ms. Olsen
provided no evidence to dispute that (i) she owed the University $588 in unpaid tuition
and a $30 late fee; (ii) she owed the $60 fee for electronic resources, or e-Resources, for
the online textbook she accessed for class; or (iii) the University appropriately attempted
to collect the $678. (R. 430-32.)
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II.

Statement of Facts
The University of Phoenix is the largest private university in North America,

specializing in making higher education accessible for working students. (R. 83.)
Ms. Olsen was a student at the University in 2004, taking various classes to fulfill the
requirements for an elementary teaching certificate. (R. 97.) The University offers
online classes, as well as classes at numerous campuses throughout the country, including
its Utah Campus located on 5300 South adjacent to 1-15. (R. 84.)
As with most college courses, courses at the University, both online and in-person,
require students to purchase textbooks or other reading materials. (R. 84-85, 324.)
Occasionally, reading materials are available online, for which the University charges a
$60 "E-Resource" or electronic resource fee—as explained in the student catalog and the
online course description on the course website for each class—in lieu of the student
having to purchase a separate textbook, often a substantial savings. (R. 84-85, 324.)
A.

Ms. Olsen Enrolls at University of Phoenix and Pays for Classes

Ms. Olsen was not enrolled in any specific program, but attended the University to
take a few specific classes related to teaching science, math, social studies, and reading
for an elementary teaching certificate. (R. 97.) Ms. Olsen originally enrolled as an
"online" student, meaning she was registered with the online campus and took her classes
online. (R. 98-99.) Ms. Olsen paid for her online classes with her credit card, either by
phoning in payment or through a pre-authorized automatic charge to her credit card,
which she provided the online campus when she first enrolled. (R. 100-104.) In the late
winter/early spring of 2004, Ms. Olsen paid for and enrolled in the following online
classes: MED 500, RDG 513, MED 506, and MED 503. (R. 113-14.)

B.

Ms. Olsen Fails to Pay for the Two Online Classes

Later, in the spring and summer of 2004, Ms. Olsen registered for two other online
courses, SPE 532 and MED 509. (R. 84, 113-14, 140.) She also elected to take MAT
534, a directed study course offered only through the Utah Campus and for which she
transferred from the online campus to the Utah Campus. (R. 84, 113-14, 140.) SPE 532
and MED 509 charged at $498 fee per course, for a total of $996, and MAT 534 charged
at $588, plus a directed study fee of $250. (R. 84, 105-06, 324.) Unlike previous online
courses that required textbooks, the readings for the Utah Campus MAT 534 class were
offered in electronic form, for which the University charged a $60 e-Resource fee upon
access of the online reading materials, as explained on the class website where the
reading materials are accessed. (R. 84, 105-06, 324.)
The University did not initially charge Ms. Olsen's credit card for the online
courses SPE 532 and MED 509. (R. 84, 115-21, 142, 144-57.) On June 2, 2004,
Ms. Olsen made a payment of $838 for the Utah Campus course MAT 534 ($588 for
tuition, and $250 for the directed study fee); on June 10, 2004, she made an additional
payment of $408 for at least a portion of the two online courses, for a total of $1246. (R.
115-21, 142, 144-57.) However, because she had not paid for SPE 532 and MED 509,
her June payments were applied first to those prior classes, then to the directed study fee
for MAT 534 (later changed to MAT 536), as follows:
SPE 532
MED 509
MAT 534/536 Directed Study

$498
$498
$250

TOTAL:

$1246
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This left a balance owing on her account in the amount of the previously unpaid tuition.
(R. 84-85,111-13,137-38.)
C.

When the University Cancels MAT 534, Ms. Olsen Enrolls in a More
Expensive Course, but the University Agrees to Charge the Same Price

The University cancelled MAT 534 before Ms. Olsen could take the class;
thereafter, in consultation with her academic advisor, Ms. Olsen decided to take MAT
536, another directed study course offered through the Utah Campus. (R. 107-08.)
Tuition for MAT 536 was $102 more than the tuition for MAT 534. (R. 140.)
In her complaint, Ms. Olsen alleged that she and the University "entered into an
agreement whereby the University agreed to accept as payment in full for the course title
MAT 536 the amount previously paid for the cancelled course MAT 534." (R. 6.) In her
deposition she explained that her academic advisor had agreed that the tuition for MAT
536 would be the same as for MAT 534 because of the class cancellation. (R. 107-08,
111-13, 137-38, 84-85.) Ms. Olsen also met with education chair Jill Muir, who agreed
that Ms. Olsen would not be charged for having to change to MAT 536 from MAT 534.
(R. 109-10.) No University representative had any discussion with Ms. Olsen about
textbooks, required reading materials, or an electronic reading materials e-Resource fee.
(R. 109-10.)
Several weeks later, after the University invoiced Ms. Olsen for the original higher
tuition rate for MAT 536, Ms. Olsen questioned the amounts and informed the University
that (i) her academic advisor had agreed she would pay the lower tuition rate; and (ii) she
believed she had already paid for the class. (R. 107-08, 124, 135, 163, 170, 179.) The
University agreed to charge the reduced price and thereafter deducted $102 from the
amounts owing on her account (the difference between what she was quoted and the
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amount normally charged for MAT 536). (Id.) Additionally, to clarify which classes had
not been paid for, the University adjusted Ms. Olsen's account to show payment for MAT
536 and a balance due for the prior classes—SPE 532 and MED 509—of $588 plus the
$60 electronic textbook e-Resource fee for MAT 536. (R. 170, 179.)
D.

Olsen was Charged $60 for Accessing and Downloading the Electronic
Reading Materials Associated with MAT 536

As explained in the student catalog and on the individual webpage for each
particular class, the required textbook for both the cancelled MAT 534 and MAT 536 that
Ms. Olsen took was electronic rather than hardback. (R. 84, 88-90, 324.) In addition to
the explanation on the course websites, prior to clicking on a link to access the reading
materials, a student is informed of the accompanying $60 e-Resource fee for accessing
and using the electronic course reading materials. (R. 84, 88-90, 324.) Accordingly,
when Ms. Olsen logged onto the University website she was informed of the e-Resource
charge and agreed to the accompanying $60 fee when she clicked on the link and
accessed the reading materials. (R. 84, 88-90, 324.)
E.

Ms. Olsen Fails to Pay the Balance Due and Admits She Owes It

Ms. Olsen did not pay her account but continued to dispute it, and, because the
account remained unpaid, in September 2004 the University added a $30 late fee per
published school policy, as reflected on the October 2004 statement. (R. 89-90, 166,
171-72, 175.) The University eventually transferred the account to collections. (R. 8990, 166, 171-72, 175.) The University nonetheless sent a letter outlining all the classes
and payments, showing a balance of $678, and explaining that while the payments on her
account summary were allocated differently (to different courses) than in the letter, the
balance due remained the same. (R. 122-23, 159-61.) The University also offered to
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waive the $30 late fee and the $60 e-Resource fee if Ms. Olsen paid the remaining
amounts, something Ms. Olsen did not do. (R. 122-23, 159-61.)
As explained in the letter, regardless of how Ms. Olsen's payments were applied,
the fact remains that Ms. Olsen did not pay for all of her classes. (R. 122-23, 159-61.)
The following amounts were charged to Ms. Olsen's account at the University:
19-Feb-04
4-Mar-04
ll-Mar-04
22-Apr-04
3-Jun-04
17-Jun-04
24-Jun-04
30-Jun-04
ll-Jul-04
ll-Jul-04
5-Aug-04
10-Sep-04
16-Feb-06
Total Charges:

MED/500
RDG/513
MED/506
MED/503
D:MAT/534
SPE/532
MED/509
D.-MAT/536
MAT/536
R:MAT/536
Transcript Fee
Late Fee
Transcript Fee

$498.00
$498.00
$498.00
$498.00
$250.00
$498.00
$498.00
$250.00
$690.00
$ 60.00
$ 5.00
$ 30.00
$ 7.00
$4280.00

Ms. Olsen made only the following payments to the University, and the University made
the following adjustments to Ms. Olsen's account (not including writeoffs):
20-Feb-04
27-Feb-04
13-Apr-04
2-Jun-04
10-Jun-04
5-Aug-04
16-Feb-06
Total Payments
16-MAR-04

l-Aug-04

($498.00)
($996.00)
($498.00)
($838.00)
($408.00)
($5.00)
($7.00)

MED/500
RDG/513
MED503

Transcript Fee
Transcript Fee

($3,250.00)
credit for dou : charge
of directed study fee due
to MAT 534/536 switch
MAT 536 tuition adjustment

Total University Adjustments

($250.00)
($102.00)
($352.00)

Total Payments & Adjustments

($3,602.00)
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This left a balance of:
Total Charges
Less Total Payments & Adjustments

$4,280.00
($3,602.00)

BALANCE

$

678.00

(R. 115-23, 142, 144-57, 159-61.)
In Ms. Olsen's deposition, she agreed she had taken the above-listed courses and
that the payments listed above were the only payments she made. (R. 115-23, 142, 14457.) Instead of disputing the amounts, Ms. Olsen changed her theory and blamed the
University for failing to deduct the amounts from her credit card, stating that it was the
University's error even though she initially disputed the amounts and that therefore she
should not have to pay for the classes she took or textbooks she used. (R. 115-23, 142,
144-57.)
Because Ms. Olsen never paid the debt, the University sent it to a collections
agency. (R. 85, 96-97, 128-33.) Indeed, the debt was included in a January 2006
settlement agreement between Ms. Olsen and one of the collection agencies whom she
also sued as a result of these transactions, which settlement agreement provided for a
payment by the collections agency to the University of $678. (R. 85, 96-97, 128-33.) In
opposing the University's motion for summary judgment, Ms. Olsen provided no
evidence of severe emotional distress or physical or mental illness as a result of the
University's alleged conduct and admitted that she never sought medical or mental health
care for anything that the University did. (R. 125-26.)
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Summary of Argument
Ms. Olsen alleged that the University wrongfully attempted to collect $678 for
unpaid tuition and fees. Based upon this allegation, Ms. Olsen brought seven related
causes of action, including breach of contract, a violation of the Federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA"), a violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act
("UCSPA"), intentional and negligent misrepresentation, and intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
Ms. Olsen's claims can be divided into three categories: (i) claims concerning the
$588 in unpaid tuition and a $30 late fee ("Tuition Claims"); (ii) claims concerning the
$60 e-Resource or electronic resource fee the University charged when Ms. Olsen
accessed an online electronic text ("e-Resource Claims"); and (iii) claims advancing tort
theories of misrepresentation and emotional distress related to the University's collection
efforts ("Tort Claims"). The Tuition Claims fail because Ms. Olsen provided no
evidence to dispute her own deposition testimony that she, in fact, did not pay tuition for
all of her classes. In addition, the FCRA claims concerning the tuition debt fail because
there is no evidence the University misreported the status of Ms. Olsen's account, or
otherwise failed to investigate or respond to her complaints. Finally, the UCSPA claim
concerning the tuition debt fails because there is no evidence of deceptive or
unconscionable acts on the part of the University.
The e-Resource Claims fail because Ms. Olsen provided no evidence that the
University agreed to waive the fee for her electronic textbook. Contrary to Ms. Olsen's
assertions in the opening brief—made for the first time on appeal without record
support—there is no evidence that she discussed the e-Resource fee with anyone at the

o

University. Instead, the University properly charged that fee after Ms. Olsen accessed the
reading materials for the class she attended and received credit for taking.
Finally, the Tort Claims fail because there is no evidence the University (i) made a
misrepresentation, let alone that Ms. Olsen relied upon a misrepresentation; or
(ii) engaged in outrageous conduct, let alone outrageous conduct that caused Ms. Olsen
emotional distress. In addition, the state law tort claims fail because they are preempted
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. For all of these reasons, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment.
Argument
It is undisputed that Ms. Olsen never paid for all of the classes she took at the
University. It also is undisputed that the University charged Ms. Olsen precisely what it
agreed to charge her in tuition. Finally, it is undisputed that the University did not agree
to waive the electronic reading materials fee, or e-Resource fee, in conjunction with
MAT 536, a fee Ms. Olsen agreed to pay when she logged into the class website and
accessed the reading materials. Based upon these undisputed facts, Ms. Olsen's claims
were properly dismissed.
I.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Ms. Olsen's Claims Related to the
University's Efforts to Collect Unpaid Tuition
All claims related to unpaid tuition fail because Ms. Olsen admits that she owed,

but did not pay, all of her tuition. Although Ms. Olsen admitted in her deposition that she
failed to pay tuition, in the opening brief she attempts to confuse the issue by jumping
between invoices and account statements. This does not change the fact that Ms. Olsen
owed tuition that she never paid, in the exact amount the University has maintained. A
review of the history of her tuition payments confirms this.
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Ms. Olsen's nonpayment first came to light in August of 2004, when the
University sent an account statement showing a balance owing of $750, including $680
for MAT 536, and the $60 e-Resource fee. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Olsen contacted the
University and told them the bill was wrong in two ways: (i) she had paid for MAT 534
in June and that payment should apply to MAT 536, and (ii) her academic advisor had
told her she would not have to pay the difference between MAT 536 and MAT 534. She
also disputed the e-Resource fee.
In response, the University adjusted her account in two ways. First, it honored the
reduced tuition amount that her academic advisor had quoted by lowering the tuition to
$588 (the cost of MAT 534). Second, the University adjusted Ms. Olsen's account to
show that the balance of $588 for tuition was due to the nonpayment of the online courses
SPE 532 and MED 509. Accordingly, the next statement reflected a total balance due of
$648, consisting of $588 in tuition for SPE 532 and MED 509, and $60 for electronic
resources. Notwithstanding the account adjustment, Ms. Olsen continued to refuse to
pay. As a result, the University assessed a late fee. The University sent Ms. Olsen a
statement in October of 2004 that included the $30 late fee for nonpayment of tuition, for
atotaldueof$678.
Because Ms. Olsen continued to refuse to pay, the University sent her account to
collections. Prior to doing so, however, it reapplied her June payments to the oldest
outstanding invoices (SPE 532 and MED 509) to bring the account as current as possible
before attempting collections. Subsequent statements therefore reflected the same
balance due of $678, including tuition of $588, for MAT 536, along with the $60 e-

Resource fee, and $30 late fee. In other words, the only thing that changed is the unpaid
tuition was attached to the last class attended, but the amount owed remained constant.
Confirming this, at Ms. Olsen's deposition she testified that she had not paid for
all of her classes. She first reviewed an account summary showing all of the courses she
attended, and all of the payments she made on her account. Ms. Olsen admitted that she
took the courses listed and that the payments made on her account were the only
payments she made. When the two were added up, she admitted, it showed the balance
the University maintains was due. (R. 115-21, 142, 144-57.) When pressed to explain
the inconsistency between her claims and the balance due, she blamed the University for
not having charged her credit card for the amount due:
A:
... They never notified me when I paid for 536 that
there was an outstanding balance. I don't - 1 think that's
unreasonable to come back two months later and say, "Hey,
you didn't pay us," when in fact I did authorize payment, so .
55

Q:

Authorized payment but didn't necessarily pay for it?

A:
It's not my responsibility to do their accounting for
them.
Q:

I understand.

A:
So I feel, you know what? Ifthey-it was their error.
They should have taken out the money if it was owed, and I they had authorization even in August.
Q:
So you think it was their bad, they lose, they didn't
take it out in time?
A:

Yes....

(R. 404-05.)
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Based upon her admission of not paying for all of her classes at the University, the
district court properly dismissed any claims related to the collection of unpaid tuition.
A.

Ms. Olsen's FCRA claim related to unpaid tuition was properly
dismissed because the University reported her account accurately and
investigated her disputes

Ms. Olsen's FCRA claim fails as a matter of law because she owed the University
the very money the University claims she owed it. FCRA requires furnishers of
information to credit reporting agencies regarding consumers to provide accurate
information, and if a furnisher of information receives notice of a consumer dispute from
a credit reporting agency, it triggers an obligation to investigate and report the results of
the investigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) - (b) (2004).
The undisputed evidence here shows that the University satisfied its obligations
under the FCRA. First, it is undisputed that Ms. Olsen owed the debt. Second,
Ms. Olsen presented no evidence that that the University misrepresented or otherwise
inaccurately reported her past-due status, or failed to investigate or respond to her
continuous disputes.1 Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate.

In the opening brief, Ms. Olsen claims that her FCRA claim survives because she
established at least two different occasions that she disputed the debt with the University.
This new, and unpreserved, claim fails because there is simply no evidence that she made
such dispute. Under FCRA, the legal duty to investigate and correct and report errors
arises only upon notice of a dispute, not from the consumer herself, but from the
consumer reporting agency. Whisenant v. First Naf 1 Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d
1312, 1316 (N.D. Okla. 2003) ("[T]hese duties are only triggered after a furnisher of
information receives notice of a consumer dispute from a credit reporting agency. In the
absence of such notification, no duty arises.") (emphasis added).
Regardless, the correspondence from the credit reporting agencies—which is in the
record—suggests that reports of Ms. Olsen's disputes were reported to the University,
and that after further investigation the University confirmed that the debt was reported
accurately (R. 232-33), a fact that Ms. Olsen did not and cannot dispute in light of her
own admission.
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B.

The UCSPA Claims Related to Unpaid Tuition Were Properly
Dismissed Because There Is No Evidence the University Misled or
Otherwise Acted in a Deceptive or Unconscionable Manner

In the district court, Ms. Olsen claimed that the University violated the UCSPA
with regard to tuition by misrepresenting (i) the amounts of tuition due on her account,
(ii) that she owed a debt, (iii) the amount of the debt before it was referred to collections,
and (iv) whether a late fee could be applied. (R. 7-8, 273-77.) Ms. Olsen's admission
that she both owed the debt and failed to pay the debt defeats every one of these claims.
The University could not have misrepresented the debt to a third party because the
University's calculation of the debt was accurate. In addition, the undisputed evidence
showed that the University tried to work with Ms. Olsen, that it honored Ms. Olsen's
explanation of the tuition match her academic counselor allegedly agreed to and adjusted
her account downward, and, per her requests and repeated discussions with the
University, adjusted the allocation of her payments to clarify the classes for which tuition
was originally owed, i.e., the two online classes, SPE 532 and MED 509.
With regard to the imposition of the late fee, the University went beyond its own
policy and did not impose a late fee until the University had (i) explained to Ms. Olsen
the status of her account and (ii) given her a chance to bring the account current. Even
after the late fee had been imposed, the undisputed evidence shows that Ms. Olsen was
given another chance to bring the account current, for which the University offered to
waive the late fee and the e-Resource fee. (R. 206-07.) Ms. Olsen refused to pay. Thus,
the University did not deal unreasonably with Ms. Olsen with regard to the late fee.

2

The late fee policy that applied to Ms. Olsen at the time was that a $30 fee would be
assessed "When tuition is not paid prior to the first class session of a course." (R. 89,
171-72.)
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Ms. Olsen also argues that the University violated the UCSPA by not disclosing
the late fee in the September 9, 2004 invoice the University sent Ms. Olsen. She argues
that the University's own Customer Account History, a separate document produced later
in discovery, shows that the late fee was imposed on September 4, 2004, but was not
disclosed in the September 9, 2004 invoice. (AOB at 28.) This allegation does not
constitute a UCSPA violation, but, assuming it did, it finds no record support. Instead,
the Customer Account History shows that the late fee was not imposed until
September 10, 2004, after the September 9, 2004 invoice, and not on September 4 as
asserted by Ms. Olsen. (R. 198.)
With regard to the reallocation of Ms. Olsen's payments, Ms. Olsen argues that
such an act is unconscionable because Ms. Olsen was never given a choice as to where
her payments would be allocated, and refers "by analogy" to concepts under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCA"). (AOB at 29.) Ms. Olsen seems to imply that
she was entitled to make decisions regarding the University's internal accounting system
or to be given notice as to how the University tracks and assigns revenues. Ms. Olsen
offers no legal support for her claim because there is none. The University is not
required to report to Ms. Olsen the details of its internal accounting system or to notify
Ms. Olsen prior to its own application of payments to negative account balances.
Regardless, Ms. Olsen's argument is contrary to the record, which shows account
adjustment at Ms. Olsen's behest. Ms. Olsen's June 2004 payment, which Ms. Olsen
made ostensibly to pay for a Utah Campus course, was internally applied to the negative
account balance arising as a result of the two online courses which had not been paid for
at the time. (R. 84-85, 111-13, 137-38, 389-92.) When Ms. Olsen received the August
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bill showing a balance for the Utah Campus course, she contacted the University to
explain that she had paid for MAT 536. (R. 107, 124,135, 163.) In response to Ms.
Olsen's concerns the University reapplied her June 2004 payment in its internal system to
show Ms. Olsen that when she had transferred from the online campus to the Utah
Campus and made a June 2004 payment, she still had a negative balance .from two
unpaid-for online courses. (R. 389-92.) Thus, contrary to Ms. Olsen's statement, the
reallocation of funds was, in fact, done in direct response to Ms. Olsen's concerns. Only
after Ms. Olsen continued to ignore the past-due amounts did the University internally
reapply the payments to the earliest account balances before pursing collections. (R. 11113,137-38.)
Finally, Ms. Olsen's reference to the FDCA is irrelevant. The FDCA has no
application in this case because (i) the FDCA applies only to debt collection agencies;
(ii) Ms. Olsen has raised no FDCA claims; and (iii) the specific provision cited, 15
U.S.C. § 1692h, applies, by its own terms, only to prevent a debt collector (which the
University is not) from applying a payment on a debt by a consumer who owes multiple
debts to any debt which is disputed by the consumer. For all of these reasons,
Ms. Olsen's argument fails as a matter of law. This court should affirm.
II.

Ms. Olsen's E-Resource Claims Also Fail as a Matter of Law
A.

The Breach of Contract Claim Concerning the E-Resource Fee Fails
Because There is No Evidence the University Agreed to Waive the Fee

The district court also properly dismissed Ms. Olsen's breach of contract claim
with regard to the e-Resource fee because there was no evidence of an agreement by the
University to waive that fee. Indeed, the only contract in existence with regard to that fee
was the one created by Ms. Olsen when she accessed the electronic reading materials and
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clicked on the link to download them after having been informed of the accompanying
$60 charge. At best, Ms. Olsen's argument is that the University somehow waived that
fee without discussing that fee with Ms. Olsen, an argument that has nothing to do with
breaching a contract.
In the spring of 2004, Ms. Olsen registered to take MAT 534, the last of the series
of classes she needed to take at the University to complete the requirements for her
teaching certificate. Before the course started, however, the University cancelled MAT
534 and offered Ms. Olsen MAT 536 in its place. MAT 536 was more expensive than
MAT 534. However, the University agreed to "accept as payment in full for MAT 536
the amount she had previously been quoted for the cancelled course MAT 534." (R. 6.)
Ms. Olsen testified that her academic counselor told her that "I would receive the same
price for MAT 536 as I would for MAT 534." (R. 108.) She also testified that she spoke
with Jill Muir, education department chair, about "whether she would be charged
additional funds for having to change to MAT 536," and that Ms. Muir said that she
would not. (R. 109-10.) Thus, the extent of an agreement between Ms. Olsen and the
University was to match the lower tuition of MAT 534, and there is no dispute that the
University did match the tuition.
Nevertheless, Ms. Olsen argues that the University's agreement to match tuition
should be deemed an agreement to waive book fees as well. Ms. Olsen offered no
evidentiary support for this novel claim. Indeed, the only evidence presented below
supported the undisputed fact that there was no discussion of book charges, required
texts, or an e-Resource fee. (R. 108-10.)

In order for a contract to exist, there must be a "meeting of the minds" with regard
to the essential elements of the agreement, "which must be spelled out, either expressly or
impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v.
Young, 2004 UT 26, ^ 16, 94 P.3d 179. Thus, to prevail on her claim for breach of
contract, Ms. Olsen would need to show some evidence that the University somehow
created a separate contract in agreeing to waive the e-Resource electronic textbook fee—
the same fee charged to all students in that class and all classes requiring an electronic
textbook. Ms. Olsen presented no such evidence, and no such evidence exists, even if
agreeing to waive a contractual right could itself be a contract capable of breach.
Indeed, the only contract addressing the electronic reading materials e-Resource
fee was not the agreement to match tuition as Olsen argues, but the contract created by
Ms. Olsen when she accessed the online reading materials in exchange for her agreement
to pay the accompanying $60 charge. Ms. Olsen denies notice of such a contract, but the
undisputed fads reveal otherwise. There is no dispute that information on the e-Resource
fee is readily available in the student catalog, as well as in the online class description
and website for each class, including MAT 536. That online description described the
required readings, advised the student of the charge for accessing the online reading
materials, and contained the link to accept the charges and access and download the
electronic text. As the University's Director of Finance testified,
Each student has an online account with the University listing
their courses. Students can click on individual classes to
check on assignments, review the course syllabus, etc. These
individual class websites also set forth the class requirements,
including required textbooks or electronic reading materials.
Additionally, if the class has electronic reading materials, as
opposed to a hard-copy textbook, there will be a link on the
webpage to the electronic reading materials, along with an
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explanation of the $60 e-Resource fee. Students are not
charged for the e-Resource fee unless and until they actually
access the electronic reading materials.
(R. 323-24.) In other words, the only way she could have accessed and been charged for
the electronic reading materials is if she clicked on the link with the explanation of the
charge, thereby creating the contract to pay $60 in exchange for access to .the required
materials. (R. 324.) Because Ms. Olsen used the materials for the class, it was
appropriate for the University to charge her for those materials.
In response to this evidence, Ms. Olsen offered nothing to the contrary, including
nothing to suggest that she did not access the reading materials, but instead now argues
on appeal that that this evidence by affidavit should be summarily ignored, suggesting it
is contrary to prior deposition testimony, and stating that "[i]n deposition, when this
subject came up, she admitted she didn't know if this statement applied to Plaintiff."
(AOB at 24.) In addition to being at odds with the cited deposition testimony, this new
argument is unsupported by any citation to the record, and the record does not support it.
The district court properly dismissed Ms. Olsen's breach of contract claim ruling that the
undisputed facts showed no agreement by the University to waive the e-Resource fee.
B.

Ms. Olsen's Argument Concerning the E-Resource Fee Is Unpreserved
and Unsupported by the Record

The claim for breach of contract that Ms. Olsen presents on appeal is significantly
different than the claim she presented to the district court. On appeal, Ms. Olsen suggests
that the contract was not the one created in her discussions with her academic advisor and
the department chair, but rather "consists of the email offer and acceptance" of May 2425, 2004, where she was given information for MAT 534, and a subsequent confirmation
of registration for MAT 536 which makes no mention of tuition. (AOB at 19.) Then
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based upon that new contract theory, Ms. Olsen argues for the first time that the district
court found an ambiguity "based on general relationship expectations," and, with reliance
on unsupported facts, argues that thereby the court wrongly determined that the
University had a right to collect the e-Resource fee. (AOB at 20.)
Ms. Olsen's argument fails for several reasons. First, Ms. Olsen'&new theories
and arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and this Court should decline
to address them. Jacob v. Bezzant 2009 UT 37, ^ 34, 212 P.3d 535 ("[W]e do not
address arguments 'brought for the first time on appeal unless the [district] court
committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist.'") (citations omitted).
Second, Ms. Olsen's argument is based upon a false premise that the district court
somehow found an ambiguity. That is not the case. Instead, the district court determined
that the undisputed facts showed no agreement by the University to waive the e-Resource
fee. (R. 436:39.)
Third, Ms. Olsen's argument on the creation of the new contract is unsupported by
the record. The May 24-25 email exchange that Ms. Olsen suggests creates a contract is
nothing more than preliminary questions by Ms. Olsen regarding MAT 534 and MAT
536 to decide which class to take, her academic counselor's response that "MAT/534 is
offered as a directed study which is $294/credit hour plus a $250 directed study fee," and
Ms. Olsen's response thanking him for the information and stating that "I've decided to
do the MAT 534 as a directed study. What do I need to do to register for that?" (R. 20203.) There was no contract, ambiguous or otherwise, created by this simple request for
information and the academic advisor's response answering her questions regarding a
course she never took. Moreover, even if a contract could somehow have been created
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by that exchange, it had nothing to do with MAT 536, the class she eventually did take,
and the class under which her contract claim arose. Indeed, it is clear from a simple
reading of the emails that this whole exchange occurred before MAT 534 was cancelled
and MAT 536 was offered as a substitute.
The evidence before the district court reveals that, as a matter of law, the
University fulfilled its agreement to match tuition, never agreed to waive the e-Resource
fee, and provided Ms. Olsen adequate notice of the e-Resource charge. The district court
did not err in dismissing Ms. Olsen's breach of contract claim as a matter of law.
C.

Ms. Olsen's E-Resource Claim Under the UCSPA Fails for the Same
Reasons

For her claim under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA")
concerning the e-Resource fee, Ms. Olsen continues to rely on her novel contract claim
based on the May 24-25 emails, arguing that those emails established "that she did not
receive actual or constructive notice that enrolling in MAT/534 (later MAT/536) would
obligate her to pay Defendant a $60 e-Resource fee," and that the "May 24, 2004, email
offering MAT/534 for $294/credit hour plus a $250 directed study fee is a written
representation concerning a price advantage that did not exist," and therefore violates the
UCSPA. (AOB at 25.) This argument is similarly unpreserved and similarly finds no
record support.
Ms. Olsen's argument fails for a number of reasons. First, it is not preserved.
Jacob, 2009 UT 37, f 34. Second, Ms. Olsen's argument of lack of notice is based upon
an email exchange about MAT 534, the class that she never took. It had nothing to do
with MAT 536, the class she eventually did take and did access the electronic reading
materials for. Indeed, the email exchange ends with Ms. Olsen saying "I've decided to

do the MAT 534 as a directed study. What do I need to do to register for that?" (R. 20203.) Of course this email exchange does not give her notice of the e-Resource fee in
conjunction with the reading materials for MAT 536—it had nothing to do with MAT
536, but was created long before Ms. Olsen decided to take MAT 536, and long before
she accessed the online reading materials for that class.
Third, Ms. Olsen's new argument on appeal that the e-Resource fee was unrelated
to any materials cost that the Utah Campus instituted, and that all other campuses simply
absorb the costs of the electronic resources, is unsupported by any valid citation to the
record. The record contains no evidence either way regarding the cost of reading
materials, the e-Resource program, or any evidence regarding any campuses other than
the Utah and online campuses. Notably absent is any indication by Ms. Olsen that she
did not have the benefit of the reading materials. The fact that she used the materials and
did not pay for them would, ironically, support an unjust enrichment claim by the
University.
Fourth, Ms. Olsen's argument that she never had actual or constructive notice of
the e-Resource fee and that the University failed to disclose this charge is contrary to the
undisputed facts. The record shows that the University explained the e-Resource charge,
and provided Ms. Olsen actual or constructive notice, in the catalog (which Ms. Olsen
admits), on her online account and individual class description for MAT 536, and finally
on the link she had to click to access the reading materials. Only after she clicked on that
link to accept the charge and download the reading materials would she have been
charged the fee. (R. 323-24.) Ms. Olsen has never claimed that she did not receive the
benefit of the reading materials—only that she never knew about the attendant charges.
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In the end, it is difficult to understand how Ms. Olsen could have believed her
textbooks were free. Regardless, the evidence reveals that the University provided
adequate notice of the electronic resources charge before the charge was incurred. With
that notice, Ms. Olsen purchased the required text. The district court did not err in
dismissing her claim under UCSPA.
III.

Ms. Olsen's State Law Tort Claims Fail As a Matter of Law
A.

Ms. Olsen Provided No Evidence of a Misrepresentation or
Unconscionable Conduct

Ms. Olsen's misrepresentation claims also were correctly dismissed by the district
court. An actionable misrepresentation occurs when a false representation of an existing
material fact is made to induce reliance thereon, and upon which the plaintiff reasonably
relies to his or her detriment. Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24,ffif27-31, 20 P.3d 876
(stating elements of cause of action and explaining difference between fraudulent or
intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation). Here, the University did
not make a misrepresentation.
Ms. Olsen argues the numerous invoices are misrepresentations because the
amounts listed and the classes listed changed. What Ms. Olsen fails to acknowledge,
however, is that the only time the amount actually changed was when the University
adjusted her account downward after being informed of the oral agreement between
Ms. Olsen and her academic advisor. Thereafter, the amount remained constant until the
imposition of the late fee. With regard to the listed classes changing, the changes were in
fact initiated by Ms. Olsen when she disputed the invoice in August of 2004. To
demonstrate that she had a negative balance for SPE 532 and MED 509, the University
adjusted her account to reflect nonpayment for those two online classes. Only after she

continued to withhold payment did the University reapply payments to the earlier
invoices to bring the account as current as possible before initiating collections.
During that time, the amount remained constant except for the imposition of the
late fee. There were no false representations. The invoices reflected the amount still
owing, which Ms. Olsen admitted not having paid. Based upon the record, Ms. Olsen's
claims for misrepresentation fail as a matter of law.
Beyond Ms. Olsen's admission that she never paid for the courses, which
undermines entirely her claims of misrepresentation, her two claims for misrepresentation
(intentional or fraudulent and negligent) were properly dismissed because there is no
evidence Ms. Olsen relied upon the alleged misrepresentations.
While Ms. Olsen claimed to have relied upon the University's representation that
she owed money, that representation is accurate. Ms. Olsen does not claim to have relied
upon any other representation. To the contrary, the debt was included in a January 2006
settlement agreement between Ms. Olsen and one of the collection agencies whom she
also sued as a result of these transactions, which settlement agreement provided for a
payment by the collections agency to the University of $678. (R. 85, 96-97, 128-33.)
Absent reliance, the misrepresentation claims fail as a matter of law.
B.

Ms. Olsen Provided No Evidence of Emotional Distress or That the
University Acted in a Deceptive or Unconscionable Manner

Because the University appropriately attempted to collect a debt that Ms. Olsen
admits she owed, the University did nothing improper to cause emotional distress when it
reported the status of Ms. Olsen's account by sending her account to collections and
reporting her delinquency to the credit bureaus. These claims also were correctly
dismissed for the additional reason that there was no evidence of any outrageous or
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intolerable conduct by the University and no evidence of actual emotional distress or
physical injury.3
1.

No Evidence of Outrageous or Intolerable Conduct

In D.D.Z. v. Molerwav Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1, 3 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
this court articulated three elements for intentional infliction of emotional-distress,
including "that defendant intentionally engaged in conduct toward the plaintiff that is
considered outrageous and intolerable in that it offends generally accepted standards of
decency and morality." There is no evidence of any such conduct here. Rather, the only
evidence shows the University's asserting its rights to collect a debt owed by Ms. Olsen,
through demand letters and account statements, and the University's responding to
Ms. Olsen's questions and correspondence by trying to explain the situation. Such
conduct by the University does not rise to the "outrageous and intolerable" level required
by law. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 68, If 38, 56 P.3d 524 ("Outrageous
conduct, for purposes of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, is conduct
that evokes 'outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair.'
Additionally, conduct is not outrageous simply because it is 'tortious, injurious, or
malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal.'")
(citations omitted). Ms. Olsen's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails
as a matter of law.
Ms. Olsen argues to the court that she was damaged as a result of the University's
administrative withdrawal of her in September 2004. It is unclear whether she makes this
argument in connection with her misrepresentation claims, her emotional distress claims,
or both. Regardless, the undisputed facts show that her administrative withdrawal was a
result of the nonpayment on her account, since by the time it took place, Ms. Olsen had
already completed all of her coursework, received all necessary credits for her elementary
teaching certificate, and in fact obtained her elementary teaching certificate and a new
job, all prior to the administrative withdrawal. (R. 411-13.)

2.

No Evidence of Emotional Distress

The district court correctly dismissed Ms. Olsen's claims for infliction of
emotional distress for the additional reason that there is no evidence of several emotional
distress or physical injury. With regard to the required element in the context of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Molerway Freight Lines articulated as the
third element of that claim a showing of "severe emotional distress." 880 P.2d at 3 n.2.
Negligent infliction requires the following element: "physical harm manifested by
objective symptomatology." Handy v. Union Pac. R.R., 841 P.2d 1210, 1217-18, 1218
n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). And "awards for negligently inflicted emotional distress arise
when physical or mental illness results from the emotional trauma itself." Dalley v. Utah
Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 201 (Utah 1990). Put another way, the "plaintiff
must experience either physical or mental symptoms as a result of the incident." Lawson
v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1995). Therefore, the claim
should be dismissed unless the plaintiff "experienced severe mental illness as a result of
the incident." IdL at 1016-17.
Here, Ms. Olsen failed to allege, and there was no evidence of, any demonstrable
physical or mental illness or substantive severe emotional injury arising as a result of the
University's alleged conduct. To the contrary, in her deposition, Ms. Olsen admitted
never having sought medical or mental health care for anything that the University is
alleged to have done. Nonetheless, in response to the University's summary judgment
motion, Ms. Olsen submitted an affidavit of alleged distress, including "severe stress and
nervousness, sleeplessness, fear, and anxiety," tight muscles, and weight gain. (R. 187.)
Yet this affidavit fails to create a factual issue because it contradicts her deposition
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testimony. At her deposition, Ms. Olsen was asked to describe her damages. She
responded that she was seeking "attorney fees, refund of the resource and late fees,
compensatory damages for time and stress," and summarized, "for the most part, I'm
looking to get back what I have had to put out in order to resolve this." Ms. Olsen denied
seeking medical or psychological treatment. (R. 410-11.)
Under Utah law, "when a party takes a clear position in a deposition, that is not
modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own
affidavit which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the
discrepancy." Harnicher v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998).
Therefore, Ms. Olsen provided no evidence of emotional distress.
Regardless, the affidavit falls short of evidence of the required severe distress.
Indeed, a careful reading reveals that virtually all of her emotional injury can be
attributed to the litigation that she initiated. (R. 187 ("It has been incredibly stressful
constantly rehashing old arguments, reading and rereading through documents, preparing
for the deposition, and worrying about the strain on my finances. That it goes on and on
is stressful.").) Moreover, "the 'emotional distress suffered must be severe; it must be
such that a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.'" Harnicher, 962
P.2d at 71-72 (quoting Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah
1993)). In Mountain Fuel where the plaintiff similarly alleged anxiety and sleeplessness,
the court explained that such symptoms did not constitute compensable distress: "Such
symptoms do not constitute illness or injury . . . . Everyone must deal with stress and
anxiety in daily life; most of us experience occasional sleeplessness. Transitory
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sleeplessness and anxiety do not amount to the type of emotional distress with which a
reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope." Hansen v. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 1993).
In other words, "mere unsubstantiated opinions that they have suffered severe
anxiety . . . do not create a triable issue of fact that would withstand summary judgment."
Id. Similarly, the symptoms averred by Ms. Olsen do not rise to the level of severe
emotional distress, but rather constitute the normal daily stress, anxiety, and sleeplessness
that the reasonable person is expected to cope with—in this case the stress created by the
litigation she initiated. Ms. Olsen's claims for infliction of emotional distress fail as a
matter of law and were properly dismissed by the district court.
C.

Ms. Olsen's State Law Claims Are Preempted By FCRA

Finally, Ms. Olsen's state common law claim for breach of contract, claim under
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, common law fraud/misrepresentation claims, and
her common law claims for infliction of emotional distress fail as a matter of law because
they are preempted by FCRA. They are preempted because they are based upon the same
facts and circumstances giving rise to her third cause of action under the FCRA, where
she alleged violations of § 1681s-2 of the FCRA. (R. 8-9.) Because her state law claims
are based upon conduct regulated by the FCRA, those claims must yield to the FCRA,
and therefore dismissal below was proper.
Title 15, Section 1681t of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t, sets forth the applicable
preemption statement: "No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of
any State . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681s-2 of
this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer
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reporting agencies . . . . " 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(l)(F) (2004). This means that if the
allegations supporting the state law claims concern conduct regulated by § 1681s-2, then
those state law claims are preempted. Knudson v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 513 F. Supp.
2d 1255, 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2007) ("The violations of state law which he has alleged
concern conduct which is regulated by § 1681s-2. Under the plain language of §
1681t(b)(l)(F), therefore, [plaintiffs] state law claims are preempted.")
Ms. Olsen argues that the above language does not apply by reason of the express
preservation of state law claims provision of the FCRA which states, as correctly quoted
by Ms. Olsen, "Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)t this title does not annul...
the laws of any State

" (AOB at 32, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) (emphasis

added).) Ms. Olsen fails to mention the "except as provided" language. In fact,
subsection (b)(1)(F) of that section sets forth the relevant exception: "No requirement or
prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State—(1) with respect to any subject
matter regulated under—... (F) section 1681s-2 of this title

" 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681t(b)(l)(F) (2004). Thus, the state law preservation provision is of no effect, and
Ms. Olsen's state law claims are in fact preempted because they are based on conduct
regulated by § 1681s-2.
Conclusion
The district court correctly dismissed Ms. Olsen's claims based on the
University's efforts to collect past-due tuition because there is no evidence that Ms. Olsen
did not owe the money to the University. Additionally, her claims were correctly
dismissed because the undisputed facts showed that (i) the University never misreported
the status of Ms. Olsen's account or otherwise failed to properly investigate or respond to
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her complaints; and (ii) the University never acted deceptively or unconscionably with
regard to its efforts to report and collect the debt.
The district court also correctly dismissed Ms. Olsen's claims based on the
University's appropriate imposition of a $60 e-Resource electronic textbook fee because
there is no evidence that the University agreed to waive that fee. Ms. Olsen had notice of
the fee, just like every other University student, and Ms. Olsen accessed and downloaded
the reading materials for use in one of her classes.
Finally, the district court correctly dismissed Ms. Olsen's tort claims because there
was no evidence that (i) the University misrepresented Ms. Olsen's account;
(ii) Ms. Olsen relied upon any representations; (iii) the University engaged in
unreasonable or intolerable actions to collect the debt; or (iv) Ms. Olsen suffered
emotional distress. In addition, Ms. Olsen's state law claims fail because they are
preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. This court should affirm.
Dated this 27th day of May, 2010.
Snell&WilmerL.L.P.

David P. Williams
Attorneys for Appellee, University of
Phoenix
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Attorneys for Defendant The University of Phoenix, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN OLSEN,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW & ORDER

vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, INC.,
an Arizona Corporation,
Defendant.

Case No. 060404298
Judge Robert Adkins

This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant,
The University of Phoenix, Inc. (the "University"). Oral argument was heard by the Court on
November 5, 2008. Chad M. Steur appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, Susan Olsen ("Ms.
Olsen"), and David P. Williams appeared on behalf of the University. The Court made a ruling
dated November 5, 2008, granting the University's motion in its entirety, and directing its
counsel to prepare an order.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, the Court enters the following findings, conclusions,
and order:
1.
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Ms. Olsen, a former student at the University, brought this action in connection
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with the University's efforts to collect a $678 debt from her for tuition, an electronic resource or
e-Resource fee, and a late fee.
2.

Ms. Olsen contested the debt, claiming that she did not owe the amounts the

University sought to collect, and claimed that the University's efforts in collecting the debt were
wrongful.
3.

The Court finds that Ms. Olsen did not pay for all of her classes at the University,

and that Ms. Olsen properly owed the University $588 for tuition plus a $30 late fee.
4.

The Court finds that the University agreed to reduce the tuition amount for MAT

536 and in fact did so. However, the Court finds no agreement with regard to the e-Resource fee,
and finds that the University properly charged Ms. Olsen the e-Resource fee in the amount of
$60.
5.

Having found that Ms. Olsen did owe the University a total of $678, the Court

concludes that the University did nothing wrong in trying to collect that amount from Ms. Olsen,
and Ms. Olsen's claims against the University fail as a matter of law.
ORDER
WHEREFOR, the Court orders that defendant's Motion for Summary judgment is
granted, and plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
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DATED this

^dayof

/flay

_, 2009.

BYT

District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Attorne
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CHAPTER 41. CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION
CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES
15 USCS § 1681S-2 (2004)
§ 1681s-2. Responsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies [Caution: See prospective
amendment note below.]
(a) Duty of furnishers of information to provide accurate information.
(1) Prohibition.
(A) Reporting information with actual knowledge of errors. A person shall not furnish any information relating to
a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
information is inaccurate.
(B) Reporting information after notice and confirmation of errors. A person shall not furnish information relating
to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if
(i) the person has been notified by the consumer, at the address specified by the person for such notices, that
specific Information is inaccurate; and
(ii) the information is, in fact, inaccurate.
(C) No address requirement. A person who clearly and conspicuously specifies to the consumer an address for
notices referred to in subparagraph (B) shall not be subject to subparagraph (A); however, nothing in subparagraph
(B) shall require a person to specify such an address.
(D) Definition. For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term "reasonable cause to believe that the information is
inaccurate" means having specific knowledge, other than solely allegations by the consumer, that would cause a
reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information.
(2) Duty to correct and update information. A person who—
(A) regularly and in the ordinary course of business furnishes information to one or more consumer reporting
agencies about the person's transactions or experiences with any consumer; and
(B) has furnished to a consumer reporting agency information that the person determines is not complete or
accurate,
shall promptly notify the consumer reporting agency of that determination and provide to the agency any
corrections to that information, or any additional information, that is necessary to make the information provided by
the person to the agency complete and accurate, and shall not thereafter furnish to the agency any of the
information that remains not complete or accurate.
(3) Duty to provide notice of dispute. If the completeness or accuracy of any information furnished by any person
to any consumer reporting agency is disputed to such person by a consumer, the person may not furnish the
Information to any consumer reporting agency without notice that such information is disputed by the consumer.
(4) Duty to provide notice of closed accounts. A person who regularly and in the ordinary course of business
furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a consumer who has a credit account with that
person shall notify the agency of the voluntary closure of the account by the consumer, in information regularly
furnished for the period in which the account is closed.
(5) Duty to provide notice of delinquency of accounts.
(A) In general. A person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a delinquent
account being placed for collection, charged to profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action shall, not later than
90 days after furnishing the information, notify the agency of the date of delinquency on the account, which shall be
the month and year of the commencement of the delinquency on the account that immediately preceded the action.
(B) Rule of construction. For purposes of this paragraph only, and provided that the consumer does not dispute
the information, a person that furnishes information on a delinquent account that is placed for collection, charged for
profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action, complies with this paragraph, if—
(i) the person reports the same date of delinquency as that provided by the creditor to which the account was
owed at the time at which the commencement of the delinquency occurred, if the creditor previously reported that
date of delinquency to a consumer reporting agency;
(ii) the creditor did not previously report the date of delinquency to a consumer reporting agency, and the
person establishes and follows reasonable procedures to obtain the date of delinquency from the creditor or another
reliable source and reports that date to a consumer reporting agency as the date of delinquency; or
(iii) the creditor did not previously report the date of delinquency to a consumer reporting agency and the
date of delinquency cannot be reasonably obtained as provided in clause (ii), the person establishes and follows
reasonable procedures to ensure the date reported as the date of delinquency precedes the date on which the
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account is placed for collection, charged to profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action, and reports such date to
the credit reporting agency.
(6) Duties of furnishers upon notice of identity theft-related information.
(A) Reasonable procedures. A person that furnishes information to any consumer reporting agency shall have in
place reasonable procedures to respond to any notification that it receives from a consumer reporting agency under
section 605B [15 USCS 5 1681c-2] relating to information resulting from identity theft, to prevent that person from
refurnishing such blocked information.
(B) Information alleged to result from identity theft. If a consumer submits an identity theft report to a person
who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency at the address specified by that person for receiving such
reports stating that information maintained by such person that purports to relate to the consumer resulted from
identity theft, the person may not furnish such information that purports to relate to the consumer to any consumer
reporting agency, unless the person subsequently knows or is informed by the consumer that the information is
correct.
(7) Negative information.
(A) Notice to consumer required.
(i) In general. If any financial institution that extends credit and regularly and in the ordinary course of
business furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency described in section 603(p) [15 USCS § 1681a(p)]
furnishes negative information to such an agency regarding credit extended to a customer, the financial institution
shall provide a notice of such furnishing of negative information, in writing, to the customer.
(ii) Notice effective for subsequent submissions. After providing such notice, the financial institution may
submit additional negative information to a consumer reporting agency described in section 603(p) [15 USCS §
_1681a(p)] with respect to the same transaction, extension of credit, account, or customer without providing
additional notice to the customer.

(B) Time of notice.
(i) In general. The notice required under subparagraph (A) shall be provided to the customer prior to, or no
later than 30 days after, furnishing the negative information to a consumer reporting agency described in section
603(p) [15 USCS § 1681a(p)].
(ii) Coordination with new account disclosures. If the notice is provided to the customer prior to furnishing the
negative information to a consumer reporting agency, the notice may not be included in the initial disclosures
provided under section 127(a) of the Truth in Lending Act [15 USCS § 1637(a)].
(C) Coordination with other disclosures. The notice required under subparagraph (A)—
(i) may be included on or with any notice of default, any billing statement, or any other materials provided to
the customer; and
(ii) must be clear and conspicuous.
(D) Model disclosure.
(i) Duty of Board to prepare. The Board shall prescribe a brief model disclosure a financial institution may use
to comply with subparagraph (A), which shall not exceed 30 words.
(ii) Use of model not required. No provision of this paragraph shall be construed as requiring a financial
institution to use any such model form prescribed by the Board.
(iii) Compliance using model. Afinancialinstitution shall be deemed to be in compliance with subparagraph
(A) if the financial institution uses any such model form prescribed by the Board, or the financial institution uses any
such model form and rearranges its format.
(E) Use of notice without submitting negative information. No provision of this paragraph shall be construed as
requiring a financial institution that has provided a customer with a notice described in subparagraph (A) to furnish
negative information about the customer to a consumer reporting agency.
(F) Safe harbor. A financial institution shall not be liable for failure to perform the duties required by this
paragraph if, at the time of the failure, the financial institution maintained reasonable policies and procedures to
comply with this paragraph or the financial institution reasonably believed that the institution is prohibited, by law,
from contacting the consumer.
(G) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph, the following definitions shall apply:
(i) Negative information. The term "negative information" means information concerning a customer's
delinquencies, late payments, insolvency, or any form of default.
(ii) Customer; financial institution. The terms "customer" and "financial institution" have the same meanings
as in section 509 Public Law 106-102 [15 USCS 5 68091.
(8) Ability of consumer to dispute information directly with furnisher.
(A) In general. The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Commission
shall jointly prescribe regulations that shall identify the circumstances under which a furnisher shall be required to
reinvestigate a dispute concerning the accuracy of information contained in a consumer report on the consumer,
based on a direct request of a consumer.
(B) Considerations. In prescribing regulations under subparagraph (A), the agencies shall weigh—
(i) the benefits to consumers with the costs on furnishers and the credit reporting system;
(ii) the impact on the overall accuracy and integrity of consumer reports of any such requirements;
(iii) whether direct contact by the consumer with the furnisher would likely result in the most expeditious
resolution of any such dispute; and
(iv) the potential impact on the credit reporting process if credit repair organizations, as defined in section 403
(3) [15 USCS 5 1679a(3)] f including entities that would be a credit repair organization, but for section 403(3)(B)(i)
[15 USCS § 1679a(3)(B)(i)1f are able to circumvent the prohibition in subparagraph (G).
(C) Applicability. Subparagraphs (D) through (G) shall apply in any circumstance identified under the regulations
promulgated under subparagraph (A).
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(D) Submitting a notice of dispute. A consumer who seeks to dispute the accuracy of information shall provide a
dispute notice directly to such person at the address specified by the person for such notices that(i) identifies the specific information that is being disputed;
(ii) explains the basis for the dispute; and
(iii) includes all supporting documentation required by the furnisher to substantiate the basis of the dispute.
(E) Duty of person after receiving notice of dispute. After receiving a notice of dispute from a consumer pursuant
to subparagraph (D), the person that provided the information in dispute to a consumer reporting agency shall—
(i) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information;
(ii) review all relevant information provided by the consumer with the notice;
(iii) complete such person's investigation of the dispute and report the results of the investigation to the
consumer before the expiration of the period under section 611(a)(1) [15 USCS 5 1681i(a)(l)] within which a
consumer reporting agency would be required to complete its action if the consumer had elected to dispute the
information under that section; and
(iv) if the investigation finds that the information reported was inaccurate, promptly notify each consumer
reporting agency to which the person furnished the inaccurate information of that determination and provide to the
agency any correction to that information that is necessary to make the information provided by the person
accurate.
(F) Frivolous or irrelevant dispute.
(i) In general. This paragraph shall not apply if the person receiving a notice of a dispute from a consumer
reasonably determines that the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant, including(I) by reason of the failure of a consumer to provide sufficient information to investigate the disputed
information; or
(II) the submission by a consumer of a dispute that is substantially the same as a dispute previously
submitted by or for the consumer, either directly to the person or through a consumer reporting agency under
subsection (b), with respect to which the person has already performed the person's duties under this paragraph or
subsection (b), as applicable.
(ii) Notice of determination. Upon making any determination under clause (i) that a dispute is frivolous or
irrelevant, the person shall notify the consumer of such determination not later than 5 business days after making
such determination, by mail or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by any other means available to the
person.
(iii) Contents of notice. A notice under clause (ii) shall include(I) the reasons for the determination under clause (i); and
(II) identification of any information required to investigate the disputed information, which may consist of a
standardized form describing the general nature of such information.
(G) Exclusion of credit repair organizations. This paragraph shall not apply if the notice of the dispute is
submitted by, is prepared on behalf of the consumer by, or is submitted on a form supplied to the consumer by, a
credit repair organization, as defined in section 403(3) [15 USCS § 1679a(3)], or an entity that would be a credit
repair organization, but for section 403(3)(B)(i) [15 USCS 5 1679a(3)(B)(i)1.
(b) Duties of furnishers of information upon notice of dispute.
(1) In general. After receiving notice pursuant to section 611(a)(2) [15 USCS § 1681i(a)(2)] of a dispute with
regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency,
the person shall
(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information;
(B) review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agency pursuant to section 611(a)(2)
[15 USCS § 1681i(a)(2)];
(C) report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency;
(D) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other
consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on
consumers on a nationwide basis; and
(E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be
verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1), for purposes of reporting to a consumer reporting agency
only, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation promptly—
(i) modify that item of information;
(ii) delete that item of information; or
(iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information.
(2) Deadline. A person shall complete all investigations, reviews, and reports required under paragraph (1)
regarding information provided by the person to a consumer reporting agency, before the expiration of the period
under section 611(a)(1) [15 USCS 5 1681i(a)(l)] within which the consumer reporting agency is required to
complete actions required by that section regarding that information.
(c) Limitation on liability. Except as provided in section 621(c)(1)(B) [15 USCS 5 1681s(c)(l)(B)] f sections 616 and
617 [15 USCS §§ 1681n, 1681o] do not apply to any violation o f (1) subsection (a) of this section, including any regulations issued thereunder;
(2) subsection (e) of this section, except that nothing in this paragraph shall limit, expand, or otherwise affect
liability under section 616 or 617 [15 USCS 5 1681n or I 6 8 I 0 ] , as applicable, for violations of subsection (b) of this
section; or
(3) subsection (e) of section 615 [15 USCS 5 1681m].
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(d) Limitation on enforcement. The provisions of law described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (c) (other
than with respect to the exception described in paragraph (2) of subsection (c)) shall be enforced exclusively as
provided under section 621 [15 USCS § 1681s] by the Federal agencies and officials and the State officials identified
in section 621 [15 USCS § 1681s].
(e) Accuracy guidelines and regulations required.
(1) Guidelines. The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Commission shall,
with respect to the entities that are subject to their respective enforcement authority under section 621 [15 USCS §
1681s], and in coordination as described in paragraph (2)~
(A) establish and maintain guidelines for use by each person that furnishes information to a consumer reporting
agency regarding the accuracy and integrity of the information relating to consumers that such entities furnish to
consumer reporting agencies, and update such guidelines as often as necessary; and
(B) prescribe regulations requiring each person that furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency to
establish reasonable policies and procedures for implementing the guidelines established pursuant to subparagraph
(A).
(2) Coordination. Each agency required to prescribe regulations under paragraph (1) shall consult and coordinate
with each other such agency so that, to the extent possible, the regulations prescribed by each such entity are
consistent and comparable with the regulations prescribed by each other such agency.
(3) Criteria. In developing the guidelines required by paragraph (1)(A), the agencies described in paragraph (1)
shall-(A) identify patterns, practices, and specific forms of activity that can compromise the accuracy and integrity of
information furnished to consumer reporting agencies;
(B) review the methods (including technological means) used to furnish information relating to consumers to
consumer reporting agencies;
(C) determine whether persons that furnish information to consumer reporting agencies maintain and enforce
policies to assure the accuracy and integrity of information furnished to consumer reporting agencies; and
(D) examine the policies and processes that persons that furnish information to consumer reporting agencies
employ to conduct reinvestigations and correct inaccurate information relating to consumers that has been furnished
to consumer reporting agencies.
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15 USCS § 1681t (2004)
§ 168It. Relation to State laws
(a) In general. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), this title f!5 USCS 55 1681 et seq.] does not annul,
alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this title [15 USCS §§ 1681 et seq.] from complying
with the laws of any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any information on consumers, or for
the prevention or mitigation of identity theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision
of this title [15 USCS §§ 1681 et seq.], and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
(b) General exceptions. No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State—
(1) with respect to any subject matter regulated under—
(A) subsection (c) or (e) of section 604 [15 USCS § 1681b], relating to the prescreening of consumer reports;
(B) section 611 [15 USCS § 1681i], relating to the time by which a consumer reporting agency must take any
action, including the provision of notification to a consumer or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed
accuracy of information in a consumer's file, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect
on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996];
(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 615 [15 USCS § 1681m], relating to the duties of a person who takes any
adverse action with respect to a consumer;
(D) section 615(d) [15 USCS § 1681m(d)], relating to the duties of persons who use a consumer report of a
consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that
consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance;
(E) section 605 [15 USCS 5 1681c], relating to information contained in consumer reports, except that this
subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting
Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996];
(F) section 623 [15 USCS § 1681s-2], relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to
consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall not apply—
(i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the Massachusetts Annotated Laws (as in effect on the date
of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]); or
(ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on the date of enactment of the
Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]);
(G) section 609(e) [15 USCS § 1681g(e)], relating to information available to victims under section 609(e) [15
USCS § 1681g(e)];
(H) section 624 [15 USCS § 1681s-3], relating to the exchange and use of information to make a solicitation for
marketing purposes; or
(I) section 615(h) [15 USCS § 1681m(h)], relating to the duties of users of consumer reports to provide notice
with respect to terms in certain credit transactions;
(2) with respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by common ownership or common
corporate control, except that this paragraph shall not apply with respect to subsection (a) or (c)(1) of section 2480e
of title 9, Vermont Statutes Annotated (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting
Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]);
(3) with respect to the disclosures required to be made under subsection (c), (d), (e), or (g) of section 609 [15
USCS § 1681g], or subsection (f) of section 609 [15 USCS § 1681g] relating to the disclosure of credit scores for
credit granting purposes, except that this paragraph—
(A) shall not apply with respect to sections 1785.10, 1785.16, and 1785.20.2 of the California Civil Code (as in
effect on the date of enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003])
and section 1785.15 through section 1785.15.2 of such Code (as in effect on such date);
(B) shall not apply with respect to sections 5-3-106(2) and 212-14.3-104.3 of the Colorado Revised Statutes (as
in effect on the date of enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]);
and
(C) shall not be construed as limiting, annulling, affecting, or superseding any provision of the laws of any State
regulating the use in an insurance activity, or regulating disclosures concerning such use, of a credit-based insurance
score of a consumer by any person engaged in the business of insurance;
(4) with respect to the frequency of any disclosure under section 612(a) [15 USCS 5 1681j(a)], except that this

paragraph shall not apply—
(A) with respect to section 12-14.3-105(l)(d) of the Colorado Revised Statutes (as in effect on the date of
enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]);
(B) with respect to section 10-1-393(29)(C) of the Georgia Code (as in effect on the date of enactment of the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]);
(C) with respect to section 1316.2 of title 10 of the Maine Revised Statutes (as in effect on the date of
enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]);
(D) with respect to sections 14-1209(a)(l) and 14-1209(b)(l)(i) of the Commercial Law Article of the Code of
Maryland (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted
Dec. 4, 2003]);
(E) with respect to section 59(d) and section 59(e) of chapter 93 of the General Laws of Massachusetts (as in
effect on the date of enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]);
(F) with respect to section 56:ll-37.10(a)(l) of the New Jersey Revised Statutes (as in effect on the date of
enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); or
(G) with respect to section 2480c(a)(l) of title 9 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated (as in effect on the date of
enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); or
(5) with respect to the conduct required by the specific provisions of—
(A) section 605(g) [15 USCS 5 1681c(g)];
(B) section 605A [15 USCS 5 1681c-l];
(C) section 605B [15 USCS 5 1681c-2];
(D) section 609(a)(1)(A) [15 USCS S 1681g(a)fl)(A)1;
(E) section 612(a) £15_USCS_§_1681j(a)];
(F) subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 615 [15 USCS 5 1681m];
(G) section 621(f) [15 USCS 5 1681s(f)];
(H) section 623(a)(6) [15 USCS 5 1681s-2(a)(6)l; or
(I) section 628 [15 USCS 5 1681w].
(c) Definition of firm offer of credit or insurance. Notwithstanding any definition of the term "firm offer of credit or
insurance" (or any equivalent term) under the laws of any State, the definition of that term contained in section 603
(I) [15 USCS 5 1681a(Q] shall be construed to apply in the enforcement and interpretation of the laws of any State
governing consumer reports.
(d) Limitations. Subsections (b) and (c) do not affect any settlement, agreement, or consent judgment between any
State Attorney General and any consumer reporting agency in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer
Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996].
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15 USCS § 1692h
§ 1692h. Multiple debts
If any consumer owes multiple debts and makes any single payment to any debt collector with respect to such
debts, such debt collector may not apply such payment to any debt which is disputed by the consumer and, where
applicable, shall apply such payment in accordance with the consumer's directions.

